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I. INTRODUCTION
All societies attempt to define and manage deviant behav-
ior. Social, economic, political, moral, religious, and medical
elements contribute to the classification of abnormal from nor-
mal behavior.1 Sexual behavior in particular has been difficult
to categorize as normal or abnormal.2 Sex offenders have been
subject to differential or discriminatory disposition by many
societies. They have been variously processed through the
criminal justice system, the mental health system, or some spe-
cially designed hybrid system.3 Society has struggled to deter-
mine whether they deserve treatment or punishment, perhaps
even death, or a combination of both, or neither.4
These dilemmas are illustrated by the history of sexual
psychopath statutes in the United States over the last half-cen-
tury. 5 These statutes, and the specialized evaluation and treat-
ment programs designed to implement them, proliferated
rapidly but have now largely disappeared.6 Massachusetts cur-
L. See generally Horacio Fabrega, Jr., An Ethnomedical Perspective of Anglo-
American Psychiatry, 146 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 588 (1989); Lewis M. King, Social and
Cultural Influences on Psychopathology, 29 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 405 (1978); Sue V.
Rosser, Is There Androcentric Bias in Psychiatric Diagnosis?, 17 J. MED. & PHIL. 215
(1992); THE DIVERSITY OF NORMAL BEHAVIOR (Daniel Offer & Melvin Sabshin eds.,
1991).
2. See generally PAUL H. GEBHARD ET AL., SEX OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF
TYPES (1965); BENJAMIN KARPMAN, THE SEXUAL OFFENDER AND HIS OFFENSES (1954);
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW (Ralph Slovenko ed., 1965); M. Ashley Ames & David
A. Houston, Legal, Socia4 and Biological Definitions of Pedophilia, 19 ARCHIVES
SEXUAL BEHAV. 333 (1990).
3. GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHIATRY AND SEX
PSYCHOPATH LEGISLATION: THE 30'S TO THE 80'S 845-52 (1977) [hereinafter
PSYCHOPATH LEGISLATION].
4. A.M. McFarthing, A Survey of the Social, Legal, Historical and "Psycho-Babble"
Factors Leading to Sex Offenders Legislation in the Areas of British Common Law
Heritage, 9 MED. & L. 1278 (1990); Robert John Kosky, Should Sex Offenders Be
Treated?, 23 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 176 (1989).
5. See generally PSYCHOPATH LEGISLATION, supra note 3.
6. As of 1991, 11 states and the District of Columbia had some form of sexual
psychopath statute: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-13-201 to -216 (West 1990 & Supp.
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rently appears to be the most active in adjudicating and confin-
ing sexual psychopaths in institutional treatment programs.7
The disuse or repeal of sexual psychopathy legislation in effect
repudiates the premises of such legislation. These premises
include: 1) sexual psychopaths can be reliably distinguished
from other sex offenders; 2) sex offenders offend because of
mental disorder or disease; 3) such mental disorders and dis-
eases are curable; and 4) mental health clinicians can accu-
rately predict which sex offenders will or will not offend over
the long-term future.'
Against this retrenchment in sexual psychopathy legisla-
tion and practice, the State of Washington in 1990 enacted the
Sexually Violent Predators statute, part of the larger Commu-
nity Protection Act.9 The statute defines a new legislative cat-
egory of sex offenders as "sexually violent predators" and
provides a scheme for their indefinite civil commitment in a
secure facility.'0 However, no recent sexual offending, vio-
lence, or antisocial behavior is necessary to commit sexually
violent predators. Commitment may be predicated upon dis-
tant past behavior, with or without criminal conviction for that
behavior." Commitment of sexually violent predators may
occur before or after they are released from prison to the com-
munity.' 2 Washington's Community Protection Act, however,
significantly differs from the sexual psychopath statutes of the
past. From a clinical perspective, perhaps the most significant
1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17a-566 to -567 (West Supp. 1992); D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 22-3501 to -3511 (1989 & Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 105-1.01 to -12
(Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A (West 1986 & Supp.
1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 526.09-.11 (West 1975 & Supp. 1992); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-
2911 to -2921 (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:47-1 to -7 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 426.510, 426.650, 426.670, 426.675, 426.680 (Butterworth 1987 & Supp.
1990); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 33-6-301 to -306 (1984 & Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 77-16-1 to -5 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-300 to -302 (Michie 1990).
7. S. Steven Yang, Treatability of the Sex Offender: Considerations of Etiology,
Pathology, and Treatment in Repealing Sexually Dangerous Offender Statutes, 8 MED.
& L. 319 (1989).
8. PSYCHOPATH LEGISLATION, supra note 3, at 861-67; see also Frederick J. Hacker
& Marcel Frym, The Sexual Psychopath Act in Practice: A Critical Discussion, 43
CAL. L. REV. 766 (1955); Irving Prager, Sexual Psychopathy and Child Molesters: The
Experiment Fails, 6 J. Juv. L. 49 (1982); David H. Guthman, MDSO Law: The
Assumptions Challenged, 4 CRIM. JUST. J. 75 (1980); Vikke Henlie Sturgeon & John
Taylor, Report of a Five-Year Follow-Up Study of Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders
Released from Atascadero State Hospital in 1973, 4 CRIM. JUST. J. 31 (1980).
9. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.09 (Supp. 1990-91).
10. Id. §§ 71.09.020(1), 71.09.060.
11. Id. §§ 71.09.020-.030.
12. Id. § 71.09.030.
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difference is that the statute provides for treatment of the sex-
ual predator in addition and subsequent to completion of incar-
ceration, rather than treatment as an alternative to
incarceration.13
This Article will critique Washington's Community Pro-
tection Act from the perspective of a clinical and forensic psy-
chiatrist.14 Part II of the Article will address and examine
problems with the statute's definitions and consider some of
the problems in conducting evaluations of proposed sexual
predators. Part III will then discuss some of the many difficul-
ties inherent in providing treatment under the statute. Part IV
will review the potential abuses, costs and risks to the partici-
pants presented by the statute. Finally, Part V will focus on
the ethical issues in providing expert medical testimony pursu-
ant to the statute.
II. DEFINITIONS AND EVALUATION
A further reflection of society's difficulty in understanding
and conceptualizing sex offenders is presented by the various
terminologies used to describe them. These terms include "sex
offenders," "sexual psychopaths," "sexually dangerous per-
sons," "mentally disordered sex offenders," "criminal sexual
deviants," and under the Washington statute, "sexually violent
predators."' 5
Sexual psychopathy and sexually violent predators are
legal, not clinical terms.' 6 As a result, difficulties arise when
clinicians, administrators, policymakers, and the courts
attempt to tailor clinical diagnoses or conditions into legal
ones. The probable result is inconsistent overinclusiveness and
underinclusiveness of the target population of sexually violent
13. Id. § 71.09.060.
14. This Article will variously refer to the mental health professionals as
clinicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, and to the professions as mental health,
psychiatry, and psychology. Unless otherwise noted, I attach no differential
significance to these terms in the present context.
15. "Sexual psychopath" is used in the District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 22-3501 to -3511 (1989); "sexually dangerous persons" is used in Illinois, ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 105-1.01 to -12 (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1991); "mentally
disordered sex offender" was the designation in California, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§§ 6300-6330, repealed by 1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 928; "criminal sexual deviancy" was used in
Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-11-3.1-1 to -37, repealed by 1978 Ind. Acts P.L. 2 § 3555,
1979 Ind. Acts P.L. 294 § 1.
16. PSYCHOPATH LEGISLATION, supra note 3 at 840; PAUL W. TAPPAN, THE
HABITUAL SEX OFFENDER: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON
THE HABITUAL SEX OFFENDER 15 (1950).
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predators. These problems are amply illustrated by the provi-
sions of the Washington statute.
A. Mental Abnormality
The statute defines a "sexually violent predator" as a "per-
son who has been convicted of or charged with a crime of sex-
ual violence and who suffers from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage
in predatory acts of sexual violence."'17 The statute further
defines "mental abnormality" as a "congenital or acquired con-
dition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which pre-
disposes the person to the commission of criminal sexual acts
in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health
and safety of others."'" Apart from this statutory definition, I
do not believe that it is possible for clinicians to operationally
define "mental abnormality."
A great variety of psychiatric symptoms, cognitive deficits,
social deficits, and histories have been reported to be charac-
teristic of sex offenders. 9 These characteristics include denial
and minimization of offending,20 cognitive distortions about
their victims,2' impaired control of angry or sexual impulses,
substance abuse, poor assertiveness and social skills,22 absence
of appropriate enjoyable activities, lack of sexual education,
problems with intimacy,23 previous sexual traumatization, as
well as deviant sexual arousal and preferences. But most of
these characteristics, which some clinicians might consider a"mental abnormality," are not unique to sex offenders and do
not discriminate sex offenders from nonsex offenders.
Undoubtedly, they do not discriminate sex offenders who are
adjudicated to be sexual predators under the statute from
17. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(1) (Supp. 1990-91).
18. Id. § 71.09.020(2).
19. See William L. Marshall & Anthony Eccles, Issues in Clinical Practice with
Sex Offenders, 6 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 68, 71-75 (1991).
20. H. G. Kennedy & D. H. Grubin, Patterns of Denial in Sex Offenders, 22
PSYCHOL. MED. 191 (1992); Richard 1. Lanyon et al., Detection of Deliberate Denial in
Child Abusers, 6 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 301 (1991).
21. See generally Gene G. Abel et al., The Measurement of the Cognitive
Distortions of Child Molesters, 2 ANNALS SEX RES. 135 (1989).
22. See Stanley L. Brodsky & Donald S. West, Life-Skills Treatment of Sex
Offenders, 6 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 97, 103-06 (1981).
23. William L. Marshall, Intimacy, Loneliness and Sexual Offenders, 27 BEHAV.
RES. & THERAPY 491 (1989).
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those who are never petitioned or adjudicated, though this is
an empirical question that remains to be verified.
Identifying certain characteristics of sex offenders does
not establish the etiology of the behavior. It is typically not
possible to determine the "cause" of sexual offending; most
behavior, sexual or otherwise, is considered multiply deter-
mined.24 Thus, the statutory requirement that a "condition...
predisposes the person to the commission" 25 of an offense is
scientifically difficult to fulfill. It could, therefore, be difficult
for a clinician, evaluating a person alleged to be a sexually vio-
lent predator, to conclude that there is, or is not, a specific"mental abnormality."
Another danger is that "mental abnormality" will be
established in a circular manner only by virtue of the sexual
offending behavior itself. In that case, the abnormality is
derived from the sexual behavior which in turn is used to
establish the predisposition to other sexual behavior.26
"Mental abnormality" connotes sufficient vagueness that
nearly any symptom, deficit, or historical detail might be
included. "Mental abnormality" is much broader than any con-
ceivable contemporary psychiatric diagnosis of mental disorder
or mental illness. The definition is too broad and elastic to
avoid improperly encompassing a wide variety of individuals,
resulting in indeterminate incarceration. Given the vagueness
of the definition, there cannot be adequate interrater reliability
or diagnostic agreement between examiners in its use. As a
result, much subjective interpretation and inconsistency will
occur among evaluators, attorneys, jurors, and courts. This
problem is compounded by the absence of a provision in the
statute for a centralized site to evaluate all proposed sexually
violent predators. George Dix described some of the "confu-
sion" that examiners faced in trying to identify the requisite
mental state in California's mentally disordered sex offender
24. SEE Gordon C. Nagayama Hall & Richard Hirschman, Toward a Theory of
Sexual Aggression: A Quadripartite Model, 59 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL.
662 (1991) (discussing possible etiological factors in sexual aggression); Howard E.
Barbaree & William L. Marshall, The Role of Male Sexual Arousal in Rape: Six
Models, 59 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 621 (1991); William L. Marshall et al.,
Exhibitionists: Sexual Preferences for Exposing, 29 BEHAv. RES. & THERAPY 37, 39
(1991) (only 14% of exhibitionists showed deviate sexual arousal to exhibition stimulus
tapes).
25. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(2) (Supp. 1990-91).
26. PSYCHOPATH LEGISLATION, supra note 3, at 866-67.
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B. Personality Disorder
The statute uses but does not define "personality disor-
der. '28 Personality disorder is defined by the current Diagnos-
tic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ("DSM-III-
R ")29 but whether the current, or any future psychiatric defini-
tion corresponds to that intended by the statute is uncertain. °
Again, the personality disorder must "predispose" the person
to the commission of criminal sexual acts. A causative rela-
tionship must be shown between the disorder and the criminal
sexual behavior,3 ' an issue that is often a matter of speculation
or meaningless circularity.3 2
While the interrater reliability for psychiatric diagnosis is
one achievement of the DSM-II13 3 and its successor DSM-III-R,
reliability of personality disorder diagnoses has been less than
optimal. In the field trials of DSM-III, the levels of agreement
for pairs of raters for personality disorders was 0.56 (kappa
coefficient).3 4 In a later study, agreements varied greatly
depending upon the particular personality disorder diagnosis.3
In this study, the best agreement was obtained for antisocial
27. George E. Dix, Differential Processing of Abnormal Sex Offenders:
Utilization of California's Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Program, 67 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 233, 236-37 (1976).
28. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(1) (Supp. 1990-91).
29. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS DSM-III-R (3d ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III-R].
30. See Jules B. Gerard, The Usefulness of the Medical Model to the Legal System,
39 RUTGERS L. REV. 377, 393 (1987) (discussing the differing purposes of the legal
system and the medical profession in recognizing mental illness); Daniel W. Shuman,
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in the Courts, 17 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 25, 26 (1989) (discussing the problems of using DSM-III
and DSM-III-R to determine legally relevant behavior).
31. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(1) (Supp. 1990-91).
32. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
33. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS DSM-III (3d ed. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III].
34. DSM-III, supra note 33, at 470. The kappa statistic expresses concordance
between different examiners while correcting for any agreement between them that
may have occurred through chance alone. A kappa of 0 indicates only chance
agreement, a value of 1.0 reflects perfect agreement, and a negative value indicates less
than chance agreement. John E. Helzer et al., Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnosis: A
Methodological Review, 34 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 129 (1977); John E. Helzer et
al., Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnosis: The Test/Retest Reliability of Diagnostic
Classification, 34 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 136 (1977).
35. Graham Mellsop et al., The Reliability of Axis II of DSM-III, 139 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1360, 1360-61 (1982).
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personality disorder, but it occurred less than half the time.36
Given the limited diagnostic agreement among clinicians for a
personality disorder diagnosis, evaluators will frequently disa-
gree about whether the proposed sexually violent predator in
fact has a personality disorder and therefore is or is not a sexu-
ally violent predator.
Psychiatric diagnosis is an evolutionary process rather
than a static event, whether for personality disorders or other-
wise. Different diagnostic systems are used throughout the
world.38 DSM-IV is under development and is scheduled for
publication in 1993;'9 future revisions undoubtedly will occur.
Such category and criterion variability are a necessary corre-
late of the legal definition of sexually violent predator; how-
ever, when those categories and criteria vary over time, the
target population of sexual predators will shift accordingly,4 ° a
potentially undesirable result.41
C. Assessment of Future Sexual Violence
Under the statute, a sexually violent predator must be
"likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence."'' This
requirement is future-oriented, requiring an evaluator, as well
36. Id. at 1361.
37. See generally Leslie C. Morey, Personality Disorders in DSM-III and DSM-III-
R: Convergence, Coverage, and Internal Consistency, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 573 (1988)
(examining the impact of DSM-III-R revisions on personality disorder diagnosis).
38. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL
CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES, ICD-10.
39. See generally Harold Alan Pincus et al., DSM-IV and New Diagnostic
Categories: Holding the Line on Proliferation, 149 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 112 (1992)
(discussing the new diagnostic categories of DSM-IV).
40. See generally A. Kenneth Fuller et al., Paraphilic Coercive Disorder, 16 J. SEX
EDUC. & THERAPY 164 (1990) (evaluating the usefulness of a controversial, proposed
new diagnosis for compulsive rapists).
41. See Irwin N. Perr, Medical and Legal Problems in Psychiatric Coding Under
the DSM and ICD Systems, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 418, 419 (1984).
The various conceptions, terminology, and criteria for antisocial personality
disorder are an interesting example of change in diagnosis relevant to the sexual
psychopath statutes. Many statutes referred either directly or indirectly to
psychopathic personalities. See PSYCHOPATH LEGISLATION, supra note 3, at 856-66. The
Washington statute does not specifically refer to antisocial personality disorders but it
is likely to be the most prevalent personality disorder among adjudicated sexual
predators. Some authorities have considered the DSM-III definition of antisocial
personality disorder to unnecessarily focus on antisocial behavior rather than
antisocial attitudes and personality traits. See Robert D. Hare et al., Psychopathy and
the DSM-IV Criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder, 100 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL.
391, 395-96 (1991); Thomas A. Widiger, Antisocial Personality Disorder, 43 HoSP. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 6, 7 (1992).
42. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(1) (Supp. 1990-91).
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as the trier of fact, to conduct a quantitative risk assessment or
to make a dichotomous (i.e., yes or no) prediction of the indi-
vidual's future sexual behavior. Such a risk assessment occurs
at the initial evaluation of the proposed sexually violent
predator, as well as at the annual evaluation of the detained,
adjudicated predator.43 The statute is concerned only with sex-
ually violent behavior, rather than nonsexual violence." This
component of the statute is clearly distinguishable from the
"dangerousness" elements of the Washington statute used to
civilly commit mentally ill persons to psychiatric hospitals
based upon prior (and predicted future) interpersonal
violence.4"
A voluminous literature in law and mental health in the
last quarter-century attests to the difficulties, if not impossibil-
ities, of predicting future violent behavior,4" despite the regu-
larity with which such predictions are made in many mental
health and legal contexts. A predominant finding has been
that false positive predictions of violence (i.e., overpredictions)
exceed true positive predictions of violence (i.e., correct predic-
tions).47  False negative predictions of violence (i.e., under-
predictions) also occur.4"
Several errors in predictions of violent behavior are rele-
vant to the implementation of the sexual predator statute.
Such errors are likely to result in substantial numbers of false
positive predictions of sexual violence, especially if the statute
is implemented in a large number of cases.
43. Id. § 71.09.070.
44. Id. § 71.09.020(4).
45. "Substantial risk that physical harm will be inflicted by an individual upon
another, as evidenced by behavior which has caused such harm or which places
another person or persons in reasonable fear of sustaining such harm." WASH. REV.
CODE § 71.05.020(3)(b) (1989).
46. See generally JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT
BEHAVIOR (1981) [hereinafter MONAHAN]; Edward P. Mulvey & Charles W. Lidz,
Clinical Considerations in the Prediction of Dangerousness in Mental Patients, 4
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 379 (1984); Edward P. Mulvey & Charles W. Lidz, Note/
Discussion, Back to Basics: A Critical Analysis of Dangerousness Research in a New
Legal Environment, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 209 (1985); Christopher D. Webster &
Robert J. Menzies, The Clinical Prediction of Dangerousness in LAW & MENTAL
HEALTH: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 158-208 (David N. Weisstub ed., 1987); Robert
M. Wettstein, The Prediction of Violent Behavior and the Duty to Protect Third
Parties, 2 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 291 (1984).
47. MONAHAN, supra note 46, at 41-50.
48. Id.
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1. Lack of Specificity in Defining the Criterion
The vagueness of statutory terminology such as "mental
abnormality" as a predicate for sexually violent behavior
ensures that there can be little interrater reliability or predic-
tive validity of risk assessments under the sexual predator
statute.49
2. Ignoring Statistical Base Rates
Predictive validity is a function of the frequency or base
rate of a behavior in a population. John Monahan has asserted
that "knowledge of the appropriate base rate is the most
important piece of information necessary to make an accurate
prediction."'  If a behavior is absent in a population, for exam-
ple, then an accurate prediction would be that it would never
occur in that population, and no particular skill would be
required to make that correct prediction.
Sex offender recidivism rates provide information about
the base rates of sexual offending in this population. A large
range of recidivism of sexual offending has been reported, both
for treated as well as untreated groups.5' Meaningful specific
recidivism data are not available for the different subcategories
(i.e., rapists, pedophiles, incest offenders) of sex offenders, con-
trolling for age, sex, race, and socio-economic status. The
absence of these data is a serious handicap for those attempting
to accurately predict sexually violent behavior.
3. Failing to Incorporate Environmental Information
It is erroneous to view any behavior as entirely a product
of an individual in isolation from the rest of the world. Violent
behavior is a result of an interaction between an individual and
his environment. It is therefore necessary to assess the contex-
tual elements of an individual's violent behavior, both in the
past and in the future. This assessment can include factors
such as marital discord, unemployment, alcohol and drug use,
and noncompliance with psychotropic medication. The failure
to use contextual data in predicting violence accounts in part
49. See generally Saleem A. Shah, Dangerousness: A Paradigm for Exploring
Some Issues in Law and Psychology, 33 AM. PSYCHOL. 224 (1978).
50. MONAHAN, supra note 46, at 34.
51. See generally Lita Furby et al., Sex Offender Recidivism: A Review, 105
PSYCHOL. BULL. 3 (1989) (reviewing the wide variation of methodologies and results in
sex offender recidivism studies).
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for much of the difficulty in attempting to predict behavior in
the community on the basis of an individual's institutional
behavior (and vice versa).
4. Short Versus Long-Term Predictions
Risk assessments or predictions of future violence will
probably be more accurate when the time period being pre-
dicted is shorter and sooner than if longer or later. While ear-
lier studies of clinical predictions of violence were concerned
with long-term (i.e., years) predictions, more recent studies
have focused on shorter term predictions particularly in the
context of civil commitment of mentally ill persons.52 The sex-
ual predator statute, however, clearly requires predictions for
the indefinite future, not ones for the short term.53
5. Type of Behavior Being Predicted
The vast majority of the research literature on predicting
future violence is concerned with nonsexually violent behavior,
often in identifiably mentally ill persons. This behavior, how-
ever, is not relevant to the sexual predator statute. Little
research has been conducted on the validity of predictions of
future sexual violence. In one Massachusetts study of commit-
ted and then released sexual psychopaths, false positive predic-
52. See generally Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Violence and Psychiatric Disorder in
the Community: Evidence from the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Surveys, 41 HOSP.
& COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 761 (1990); Antonio Convit et al., Predicting Assaultiveness
in Psychiatric Inpatients: A Pilot Study, 39 HOsP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 429
(1988); Jeffrey S. Janofsky et al., Psychiatrists' Accuracy in Predicting Violent
Behavior on an Inpatient Unit, 39 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1090 (1988);
Deidre Klassen & William A. O'Connor, Predicting Violence in Schizophrenic and
Non-Schizophrenic Patients: A Prospective Study, 16 J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY 217
(1988); Deidre Kiassen & William A. O'Connor, A Prospective Study of Predictors of
Violence in Adult Male Mental Health Admissions, 12 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 143
(1988); Dale P. McNiel & Ren6e L. Binder, Predictive Validity of Judgments of
Dangerousness in Emergency Civil Commitment, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 197 (1987);
Dale E. McNiel et al., Predictors of Violence in Civilly Committed Acute Psychiatric
Patients, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 965 (1988); Dale E. McNiel & Renee L. Binder,
Relationship Between Preadmission Threats and Later Violent Behavior by Acute
Psychiatric Inpatients, 40 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 605 (1989); Svein
Blomhoff et al., Can Prediction of Violence Among Psychiatric Inpatients Be
Improved?, 41 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 771 (1990); Steven P. Segal et al.,
Civil Commitment in the Psychiatric Emergency Room: 1. The Assessment of
Dangerousness by Emergency Room Clinicians, 45 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 748
(1988).
53. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.060(1) (Supp. 1990-91).
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tions outnumbered true positive predictions two to one., In a
California sample of released mentally disordered sex offend-
ers, still thought to be a danger to the community, only
twenty-four percent were reconvicted for a sex crime within
the follow-up period of five years,5 and eleven percent were
convicted of nonsexual crimes against persons.
In summary, little evidence supports the claim that clini-
cians and triers of fact, in implementing the sexual predator
statute, are able to predict future sexual violence in the long
term.5  At best, one can conclude only in a general way that
past sexual behavior tends to predict future sexual behavior.
Thus, only in the extremes--either very large number of past
sexually deviate acts or none at all-can predictions of future
sexual violence be reliably made. While sexually deviant
behavior and sexual violence are often recidivistic, attempts to
predict sexual violence will typically result in substantial num-
bers of false positive predictions, with severe consequences to
the false positive individual.
D. Treatability
The statute does not require that an individual be consid-
ered treatable before adjudication as a sexual predator. This
54. Harry L. Kozol et al., The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 19
CRIME & DELINQ. 371, 390-91 (1972). Although this study is widely cited for the failure
of predictions of long-term sexual dangerousness, several methodological problems
with the study limit its usefulness. First, most of the sample of male convicted
offenders, who had been referred to a center for diagnostic evaluation pursuant to the
Massachusetts "sexually dangerous persons" statute, had previous convictions for
sexual offenses as the predicate offense. Id. at 378. Second, the postrelease recidivism
crimes included nonsexual as well as sexual crimes ("serious assaultive crimes"). Id. at
390. Third, George Dix contended that predictive decisions are least likely to be
accurate in samples in which the courts have disagreed with the clinical determination,
as compared to cases in which the court would agree. George E. Dix, Determining the
Continued Dangerousness of Psychologically Abnormal Sex Offenders, 3 J.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 327, 329 (1975).
55. Vikki Henlie Sturgeon & John Taylor, Report of a Five-Year Follow-up Study
of Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders Released from Atascadero State Hospital in 1973,
4 CRIM. JUST. J. 31, 58 (1980). This compared with a reconviction rate of 25% for a
prison control group who had been convicted of sexual crimes but were not found to
be mentally disordered sex offenders. The same study found a false negative rate of
12% for convictions for sexual crimes in the followup interval. The use of reconviction
rates as an outcome measure likely maximizes the false positive prediction rates
because many sexual offenses are never reported or prosecuted. A. Nicholas Groth et
al., Undetected Recidivism Among Rapists and Child Molesters, 28 CRIME & DELINQ.
450 (1982).
56. GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON COMMUNITY PROTECTION, DEP'T OF SOCIAL AND
HEALTH SERVICES, FINAL REPORT IV-4 (1989) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
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failure to require amenability to treatment distinguishes the
statute from some of the earlier sexual psychopath statutes5 7
as well as from many civil commitment statutes that require
the individual to need treatment or to be treatable .5  The
absence of a treatability requirement implicitly concedes the
nontreatable nature of many sex offenders5 9 and antisocial per-
sonality disordered individuals;' it also reemphasizes that the
statute prioritizes incapacitation over treatment and rehabilita-
tion. It is clear from the statute that obviously untreatable
individuals could still be adjudicated as sexual predators.
While some of the sexual psychopath statutes have been criti-
cized as a product of the unrealizable therapeutic zeal of ear-
lier times,6' this would not appear to be the case with the
Washington statute.
E. Least Restrictive Alternative
The statute does not require that adjudication of a sexual
predator and the subsequent indefinite detention be the "least
restrictive alternative" consistent with the treatment needs of
the individual. The absence of this feature, characteristic of
many civil commitment statutes, 62 again reveals the nonthera-
57. California's sexual psychopath statute, repealed in 1982, required a person
adjudicated as a mentally disordered sex offender to be committed to a state hospital
only if he is "amenable to treatment." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6316, repealed by
1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 928.
58. SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (3d ed.
1985).
59. See also Furby, supra note 51, at 22-25 (reviewing conflicting results of studies
examining treatment effectiveness and recidivism); William L. Marshall et al.,
Treatment Outcome With Sex Offenders, 11 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 465 (1991)
(concluding that some treatments were effective for child molesters and exhibitionists,
but not for rapists).
60. See generally Glen 0. Gabbard & Lolafaye Coyne, Predictors of Response of
Antisocial Patients to Hospital Treatment, 38 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1181
(1987) (examining failure of antisocial patients to respond to treatment, with many
discharging themselves prematurely); James R. P. Ogloff et al., Treating Criminal
Psychopaths in a Therapeutic Community Program, 8 BEHAV. SCi. & L. 181 (1990)
(finding that psychopaths were less motivated for treatment, improved less, and were
discharged from treatment earlier than nonpsychopaths); Eleanor Stein & Jennifer D.
Brown, Group Therapy in a Forensic Setting, 36 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 718, 720-21 (1991)
(finding that forensic patients were unable to benefit from group therapy in contrast
to other patients).
61. PSYCHOPATH LEGISLATION, supra note 3, at 853-54.
62. The California sexual psychopath statute provided for carefully monitored
outpatient treatment in the community as an alternative to hospitalization for
individuals adjudicated as sexual psychopaths. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6316,
repealed by 1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 928. However, this outpatient treatment was not
available in every county. Donald T. Lee, Implications of the Atascadero Study With
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peutic intent of the legislative scheme.
F. Nature and Extent of the Evaluation
The Washington statute is silent as to the nature and
extent of the evaluation of a proposed sexually violent
predator or the qualifications of the evaluator. Given the
severe consequences to the detained individual after adjudica-
tion, these issues deserve serious consideration. The evaluation
of a proposed sexually violent predator should be extensive
and as thorough as possible.63 This evaluation is especially
important given the magnitude of the harm to the alleged
predator should wrongful confinement occur under the statute.
Ideally, an evaluation should include the following: (1) a
review of all relevant records, such as previous mental health
evaluations, treatment records, previous presentencing evalua-
tions, school and work records; (2) psychiatric interview and
mental status examination, including family, social, work, and
medical histories; (3) psychological testing;' (4) medical and
neurological testing, such as neuropsychological and neuroradi-
ological testing; (5) comprehensive psychosexual history and
(6) plethysmography.65 If at the outset it appears that ade-
Regard to Community Outpatient Treatment, 4 CRIM. JUST. J. 65, 66-67 (1980); see also
Ingo Keilitz et al., Least Restrictive Treatment of Involuntary Patients: Translating
Concepts Into Practice, 29 ST. Louis U. L.J. 691, 693 (1985) (noting that 19 states
clearly provide this right, while 47 states arguably provide for it). The American
Psychiatric Association's model commitment law also provides that every patient has
the right to treatment that is least restrictive of the individual's physical and social
liberties. Guidelines for Legislation on the Psychiatric Hospitalization of Adults, 140
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 672, 676 (1983).
63. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, PSYCHIATRY IN THE SENTENCING PROCESS:
A REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE ROLE OF PSYCHIATRY IN THE SENTENCING
PROCESS 17-19 (1984) [hereinafter PSYCHIATRY TASK FORCE REPORT] (discussing the
need for and extent of completeness in the presentencing psychiatric evaluation).
64. See generally Ron Langevin et al., Use of the MMPI and its Derived Scales
with Sex Offenders (parts I & 2), 3 ANNALS SEX RES. 245, 453 (1990). It has often been
noted that psychologists rely more on psychological testing for data in forensic
contexts than psychiatrists. See Mary Ann Deitchman et al., Self-Selection Factors in
the Participation of Mental Health Professionals in Competency for Execution
Evaluations, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 287, 300 (1991).
65. The penile plethysmograph measures blood flow to the penis. The ability to
detect changes in penile circumference permits an objective measure of male sexual
arousal. Audio or visual sexual stimuli are then administered to the subject while
recording his arousal. James G. Barker & Robert J. Howell, The Plethysmograph: A
Review of Recent Literature, 20 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 13 (1992); see
generally Kurt Freund & Ray Blanchard, Phallometric Diagnosis of Pedophilia, 57 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 100 (1989); Joseph C. Blader & William L.
Marshall, Is Assessment of Sexual Arousal in Rapists Worthwhile? A Critique of
Current Methods and the Development of a Response Compatibility Approach, 9
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quate information would be unavailable to complete the assess-
ment, then the evaluator may be justified in refusing to
participate in it.'S
G. Qualifications of the Evaluator
General clinical experience, outside the forensic or correc-
tional mental health settings, is clearly inadequate to prepare
one for clinical work with sex offenders.67 There is as yet no
nationally practiced credentialing or licensing process for those
individuals who assert expertise in evaluating and treating sex
offenders.s Given that sex offenders are a heterogeneous pop-
ulation,69 an evaluator would need to have training or super-
vised experience with the variety of ages (juvenile, adult,
geriatric) and psychopathologies common to sex offenders
(psychosis, affective disorders, mental retardation, personality
disorders, substance abuse disorders,70 and organic mental dis-
orders).7 ' The clinician need also be skilled in differential
diagnosis of these disorders. Furthermore, specialized training
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 569 (1989); William L. Marshall et al., Exhibitionists: Sexual
Preferences for Exposing, 29 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 37 (1991) (arguing against the
usefulness of assessing deviate sexual arousal for exhibitionists). See also Eli Coleman
& Margretta Dwyer, Proposed Standards of Care for the Treatment of Adult Sex
Offenders, 16 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 93, app. (1990) (describing standards for
use of the penile plethysmograph).
66. "Evaluators should accept for assessment only those cases in which there is a
reasonable expectation that the referral questions can be answered." Robert J.
McGrath, Assessment of Sexual Aggressors, 5 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 507, 508
(1990).
67. In some states, any physician can be an examiner for the civil commitment of
a mentally ill person. BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 58, at 52.
68. I am unaware of any formal, fulltime postgraduate fellowship programs in
psychology or psychiatry that are exclusively devoted to training a clinician to be an
evaluator or therapist for sex offenders, although continuing education courses and
seminars in this area exist.
69. William S. Packard & Richard Rosner, Psychiatric Evaluations of Sexual
Offenders, 30 J. FORENSIC SCi. 715 (1985); Gordon C. Nagayama Hall et al., MMPI
Taxonomies of Child Sexual and Nonsexual Offenders: A Cross-Validation and
Extension, 58 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 127, 135 (1992).
70. Training in the area of substance abuse disorders should include familiarity
with research examining the relationship between alcohol use and violence. For an
example of such research, see Richard T. Rada et al., Drinking, Alcoholism, and the
Mentally Disordered Sex Offender, 6 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 296 (1978)
(surveying hospitalized mentally disordered sex offenders in California with regard to
their use of alcohol at the time of their predicate offense and the presence of
alcoholism).
71. See Benjamin Graber et al., Brain Damage Among Mentally Disordered Sex
Offenders, 27 J. FORENSIC SCI. 125, 128 (1982) (stating that 50% of sex offenders who
were tested demonstrated "brain dysfunction").
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and formal supervised experience in evaluating and treating
sex offenders of all types in several settings is necessary to
become a competent practitioner in this area. It is preferable
to have active rather than previous involvement in the area of
practice.72 Finally, training and experience in malingering and
dissimulation are necessary in evaluating sex offenders.73
Coleman and Dwyer proposed that clinicians should meet
four minimum standards to be considered competent profes-
sionals in "sexology": (1) a minimum of a master's degree or
its equivalent in a clinical field granted by an accredited insti-
tution; (2) a license or certification to practice in an area of
mental health; (3) "demonstrated specialized competence in
sex therapy as indicated by documentable training and super-
vised clinical experience and continuing education in sex ther-
apy"; and (4) "demonstrated specialized competence in
counseling and diagnosis of paraphilias and sex offending
behaviors as documentable by training or supervised clinical
experience, along with continuing education."74
H. Therapists as Evaluators
By consensus, a patient's therapist should not serve as an
evaluator in any administrative or legal proceeding.7" The
72. See American College of Physicians, Guidelines for the Physician Expert
Witness, 113 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 789, 789 (1990) ("The physician expert witness
[in a medical malpractice case] should be familiar with the clinical practice of the
specialty or the subject matter of the case at the time of the alleged occurrence giving
rise to the claim, and should be actively involved in the clinical practice of the
specialty or the subject matter of the case for three of the previous five years at the
time of the testimony.").
73. "Malingering" is defined as the "intentional production of false or grossly
exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external incentives
such as avoiding military conscription or duty, avoiding work, obtaining financial
compensation, evading criminal prosecution, obtaining drugs, or securing better living
conditions." DSM-III-R, supra note 29, at 360. Dissimulation is a more "general term
to describe an individual who is deliberately distorting or misrepresenting his or her
psychological symptoms." CLINICAL ASSESSMENT OF MALINGERING & DECEPTION 5 (R.
Rogers ed., 1988); see generally Linda S. Grossman & James L. Cavanaugh, Jr.,
Psychopathology and Denial in Alleged Sex Offenders, 178 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL
DISEASE 739, 742-43 (1990) (noting that alleged sex offenders may deny
psychopathology as well as their sex offense).
74. Coleman & Dwyer, supra note 65 at 97-98.
75. See Robert D. Miller, The Treating Psychiatrist as Forensic Evaluator, 29 J.
FORENSIC ScI. 825 (1984) (stating that although legal and clinical literature emphasizes
the importance of impartial expert testimony, there may be advantages to having
clinicians more involved in forensic science); Robert D. Miller, The Treating
Psychiatrist as Forensic Evaluator in Release Decisions, 32 J. FORENSIC Sci. 481 (1987);
Robert D. Miller, Ethical Issues Involved in the Dual Role of Treater and Evaluator,
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therapeutic relationship can be significantly distorted once the
therapist has even agreed to prepare a report or testify on
behalf of the patient. Such evaluations obscure the therapist's
obligations to the patient, risk motivating the therapy by an
external tangible benefit ("secondary gain"),76 and engender
the patient's animosity should the therapist fail to support the
patient's legal claim. Similarly, the quality of the forensic eval-
uation when conducted by the therapist is lower compared to
that conducted by an independent evaluator who has no pre-
existing relationship with the patient. It is difficult for the
therapist to be objective about a person with whom he has
been intimately involved over an extended period of time.
Formal evaluations for entry or release as a predator
should be conducted by independent staff, not the patient's
therapist; preferably it will be conducted by those who are
independent contractors rather than employees of the state.
There is evidence to suggest that agency can bias forensic eval-
uations: Employees can, even unintentionally, assume the val-
ues and orientation of the state agency that employs them,
thus compromising their objectivity.7 Failure to distinguish
and separate the evaluative and therapeutic functions com-
promises both the court evaluations as well as the treatment
program for sexual predators.78
in ETHICAL PRACTICE IN PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 129-50 (Richard Rosner & Robert
Weinstock eds., 1990).
76. "Secondary gain" is the "external gain derived from any illness, such as
personal attention and service, monetary gains, disability benefits, and release from
unpleasant responsibility." AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, THE AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION'S PSYCHIATRIC GLOSSARY 122 (1984). Secondary gain is
distinguished from "primary gain," which represents an emotional benefit obtained
from a psychological defense mechanism. Id. at 109.
77. There is no reason to believe that loyalty to one's employer, (here a state
agency) even if it is an institution, is any less likely to bias an evaluator than pretrial
forensic evaluations conducted at the request of the defense or prosecution. See
Richard Rogers, Ethical Dilemmas in Forensic Evaluations, 5 BEHAV. Sm. & L. 149
(1987). Rogers notes that "the forensic clinician may see him/herself as the agent of
the defendant, defense attorney, prosecuting attorney, or the court itself." Id. at 150.
He also asks: "Are clinicians unduly biased by agency? Do forensic experts engage in
either self-deception and/or conscious misrepresentation regarding whom they see as
the client? Does agency necessarily compromise objectivity?" Id.
78. See, e.g., Han Blankstein, Organizational Approaches to Improving
Institutional Estimations of Dangerousness in Forensic Psychiatric Hospitals: A
Dutch Perspective, 11 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 341 (1988). Blankenstein suggests the
following:
Those who are actively engaged in treatment contacts with the patients have
first-hand information concerning these patients and are, therefore, best
informed about their psychological condition; nevertheless, therapists
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III. TREATMENT ISSUES
The Washington legislature acknowledged that "the prog-
nosis for curing sexually violent offenders is poor, the treat-
ment needs of this population are very long term, and the
treatment modalities for this population are very different
than the traditional treatment modalities for people appropri-
ate for commitment under the involuntary treatment act. 79
Several potential problems arise in implementing a treatment
program for the adjudicated predator, which render the pro-
gram essentially one of indeterminate, preventive detention
rather a therapeutic one.
A. Can Meaningful Treatment Be Offered?
Every governmental agency has finite resources which can
be devoted to any particular problem or group. Funds for
health care in the public as well as private sectors are increas-
ingly in demand, as growth of health care expenditures rapidly
continues. Securing funding for mental health care in the pub-
lic sector has traditionally been difficult, even more so in the
1990's. Public resources are not even available for recognized,
cost-effective, therapeutic advances in nonoffender patient
populations. 80 For the foreseeable future, treatment resources
for sex offenders will probably not be abundant, whether in
themselves should not have final responsibility in regard to matters of leave
or advice to court about the necessity of prolongation of T.B.R. Time and
again we see that therapists are prone to overreaction. Sometimes they are
overprotective and hesitate to trust the patient's capacity to grow and govern
his own life. At other times they can be subtly overaggressive. Because of the
frustrations and personal hurts our patients can cause, therapists fight back,
creating a situation of mutual distrust. Sometimes therapists are too close,
evaluating the patient too optimistically to ally themselves with a patient or
out of fear of his aggression. Therefore, forensic administrators must ensure
that final responsibility regarding matters of freedom of movement and
prediction of dangerousness lies with the general management of the clinic-
professionals who are familiar with the patients but have no direct treatment
contact with them.
Id. at 344. See also Orest E. Wasyliw et al., Clinical Considerations in the Community
Treatment of Mentally Disordered Offenders, 11 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 371, 374
(1988) ("It can be difficult to assess a patient's clinical status objectively, for example,
when the therapist knows that a rehospitalization may cost the patient a hard-won job,
or when the therapist fears that the court may deal harshly with reports of
noncompliance.").
79. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (Supp. 1990-91).
80. See, e.g., Dennis A. Revicki et al., Cost-Effectiveness of Cozapine for
Treatment-Resistant Schizophrenic Patients, 41 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 850,
850 (1990).
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the institution or in the community.81 Much of public senti-
ment indicates that sex offenders deserve punishment rather
than treatment or rehabilitation. Sex offenders enjoy the low-
est social statutus even among other prisoners. Funding the
predator program will compete with demands to treat the
nonoffender mentally ill, to fund forensic mental health set-
tings, and to treat offender populations whether sex offenders
or otherwise. Requests for costly specialized evaluation tech-
niques (e.g., plethysmography) or antiandrogen medication 2
(e.g. medroxyprogesterone acetate) used to reduce sexual fan-
tasy and performance are typically difficult to fufill given
programmatic needs in multiple facilities.8 3 Where the margi-
nal public treatment dollar should be expended should and
will be debated.' Funding limitations may result in providing
only perfunctory treatment (e.g., one form of group therapy
for all offenders) and ultimately a custodial system of care,
which has been characteristic of many public mental health
facilities.8 5
81. See Allen D. Sapp & Michael S. Vaughn, Sex Offender Rehabilitation
Programs in State Prisons: A Nationwide Survey, 17 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 55
(1991). Resource allocation for mental health services often depends upon the political
mobilization of the affected parties. See, e.g., David L. Braddock, Community Mental
Health and Mental Retardation Services in the United States: A Comparative Study of
Resource Allocation, 149 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 175 (1992) (stating that spending for
community mental retardation services grew four times more rapidly than spending
for community mental health services, which was accounted for by mental retardation
consumer advocacy groups). Sex offenders, especially sexually violent predators who
are indefinitely confined in institutional programs, are unlikely to gain such consumer
support in the near future. Consumer support is improbable, even though treatment is
likely to be cost-effective. Robert Prentky & Ann Nolbert Burgess, Rehabilitation of
Child Molesters: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 60 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 108 (1990).
82. See, e.g., John M. W. Bradford, Organic Treatments for the Male Sexual
Offender, 3 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 355, 360-65 (1985).
83. Bowden asks whether our failure to provide antiandrogen therapy to sex
offenders when useful is "linked with a covert desire to punish them." Paul Bowden,
Treatment: Use, Abuse & Consent, 1 CRIM. BEHAV. & MENTAL HEALTH 130, 135 (1991).
84. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Terkelsen & Ren6e Grosser, Estimating Clozapine's Cost
to the Nation, 41 HOsp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 863, 868-69 (1990).
85. Mental health treatment in state hospitals that fails to provide a humane
psychological and physical environment with adequate numbers of qualified staff has
prompted class action litigation. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala.
1972) (ordering state hospital to comply with minimum constitutional standards for
civilly committed patients), rev 'd in part on other grounds, Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974). See also E. Haavi Morreim, The New Economics of Medicine:
Special Challenges for Psychiatry, 15 J. MED. & PHIL. 97 (1990) (discussing how
economics determines modes of care in psychiatry).
616 University of Puget Sound Law Review
B. Are Sexually Violent Predators Treatable?
That the state may decide to make treatment available to
sexual predators under the statute is only the first step. More
fundamental is the question of whether such treatment will be
useful to the sexual predators. Nearly all forms of mental
health treatment require the active participation of the patient
to secure success; typically treatment can not be simply admin-
istered to the patient in the absence of patient motivation and
involvement.8 6
In recent years, considerable progress has been made in
developing appropriate treatment modalities and programs for
sex offenders.8 7 Some limited evidence of treatment efficacy
for certain classes of sex offenders has also been obtained.88
Most of these studies have been conducted in community set-
tings rather than in the institutional treatment setting at issue
here. The question posed here, however, is not whether sex
offenders are per se treatable, but whether the sex offender
committed as sexually violent predator is treatable in this situ-
ation. A more particularized perspective asks which offenders
are treatable with which techniques under what circumstances.
Offenders who have been committed as sexual predators
have most likely failed to participate or benefit from early
attempts at treatment whether in the community (voluntary or
as a condition of probation and parole) or in prison. Many will
have persistently and pervasively denied their sexual offend-
ing, externalized responsibility, or claimed (genuine or
feigned) amnesia for their offenses. Given that commitment as
a predator is the "end of the line" for sex offenders, the
predator program will probably receive the least treatable
offenders.
Many predators will be committed as predators only after
extended periods of incarceration.89 These extended periods
create two important problems for treatability.
86. See James R. P. Ogloff et al., Treating Criminal Psychopaths in a Therapeutic
Community Program, 8 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 181, 186 (1990) (describing a study finding
that psychopaths were less motivated for treatment, improved less, and were
discharged from treatment earlier than nonpsychopaths).
87. See, e.g., THE SEXUAL AGGRESSOR: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON TREATMENT
(Joanne G. Greer & Irving A. Stuart eds., 1983); HUMAN SEXUAL AGGRESSION:
CURRENT PERSPECTIVES (Robert A. Prentky & Vernon L. Quinsey eds., 1988);
HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL ASSAULT: ISSUES, THEORIES, AND TREATMENT OF THE
OFFENDER (William Marshall et al. eds., 1990).
88. See supra note 57-61 and accompanying text.
89. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.030(1), (2) (Supp. 1990-91).
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1. Treatment Delays
Treatment for sexual offending that begins many years
after the underlying sex offense is relatively more difficult
than that which occurs soon thereafter. Delays before treat-
ment begins permit opportunities for significant distortions
and defenses by the offender. Such cognitive distortions9° (e.g.,
did the victim consent or resist) become further consolidated
over time, making it more difficult for the offender to truly
accept responsibility for his earlier behavior. The passage of
time also permits loss of memory of the offenses, which, in
many cases, were poorly recalled initially because of intoxica-
tion. An offender may have little objectively correct recollec-
tion of an offense ten or twenty years after an offense, as seen
by contrasting offenders' accounts of their crimes with official
records.91
2. Influence of the Prior Prison Environment
Few, if any, correctional institutions are designed to func-
tion as therapeutic environments, much less actually do so.
That the committed predator has already spent much of his
life in such an environment likely reduces his ability to benefit
from treatment. Most maximum security correctional facilities
are violent, threatening, antisocial mileus in which an inmate
is socialized to avoid disclosing personal weakness or vulnera-
bility, avoid taking responsibility for his crime, or reveal him-
self to be a sex offender for fear of retaliation.9 2 Inmates
develop socially acceptable alibis, which are at odds with the
real crime, to please themselves as well as family and support-
ers. Prison gives no incentives for a sex offender to discuss his
offense, especially if the case is still on appeal. Again, the
prison environment helps to engender a distorted view of the
precipitating offense, which later must be dissected and decon-
structed during the initial stages of sex offender treatment.
Whether this can be thoroughly accomplished has never been
studied.
90. See, e.g., Gisli H. Gudjonsson, Cognitive Distortions and Blame Attribution
Among Pedophiles, 183 SEXUAL & MARITAL THERAPY 183 (1990); Gene G. Abel et al.,
Complications, Consent, and Cognitions in Sex Between Children and Adults, 7 INT'L
J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 89 (1984).
91. This inaccurate recollection is often true initially as well.
92. HANS TOCH ET AL., COPING: MALADAPTATION IN PRISON (1989); HANS TOCH,
LIVING IN PRISON (1977).
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C. Coerced and Involuntary Treatment
Most or all commitments under the statute will be invol-
untary. Therefore, treatment of the predator should be prop-
erly viewed as coerced, whether or not the offender has a legal
right to refuse to participate in treatment. Is coerced treat-
ment of sex offenders or mentally ill persons effective? Civil
commitment of the mentally ill is common throughout the
United States,93 but in the absence of controlled clinical trials,
there is little way to scientifically determine its efficacy. 94
Involuntary treatment of substance abusers has been shown to
be effective, largely by keeping the patients in treatment
longer.95
Mandated or coerced treatment approaches are typical in
forensic mental health and correctional environments. This
approach creates its own problems, as well as opportunities. In
enforced treatment, patients come to view their therapists as
their jailers, agents of the state, and punitive authority
figures.96 Involuntary patients learn to minimize symptoms,
ingratiate their therapists, and seek forgiveness.9 The recipro-
cal, mutual, trusting relationship in voluntary mental health
treatment is often reduced to a game of manipulations by the
patient and staff in involuntary treatment.98
93. See generally Marilyn J. Rosenstein et al., National Institute of Mental Health,
Legal Status of Admissions to Three Inpatient Psychiatric Settings, 178 MENTAL
HEALTH STATISTICAL NoTE 1 (Oct. 1986).
94. See Mary L. Durham & John Q. La Fond, A Search for the Missing Premise of
Involuntary Therapeutic Commitment: Effective Treatment of the Mentally Ill, 40
RUTGERS L. REV. 303, 351-56 (1988) (reviewing efficacy of treatment studies of civilly
committed patients).
95. M. Douglas Anglin & Yih-Ing Hser, Criminal Justice and the Drug-Abusing
Offender: Policy Issues of Coerced Treatment, 9 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 243 (1991);
NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, RESEARCH MONOGRAPH 86, COMPULSORY
TREATMENT OF DRUG ABUSE: RESEARCH & CLINICAL PRACTICE (1988).
96. Wasyliw et al., supra note 78.
97. See generally GEORGE HARRIS & DAVID WATKINS, COUNSELING THE
INVOLUNTARY AND RESISTANT CLIENT (1987).
98. Judi Chamberlin, An Ex-Patient's Respcnse to Solitary, 173 J. NERVOUS &
MENTAL DISEASE 288 (1985). In discussing her views about seclusion in psychiatric
hospitals, the author states:
Most patients are smart; they quickly learn that certain behaviors elicit
desirable (or undesirable) reactions from staff. Patients are most likely to be
thought "well" when the[y] express the ideology of staff and "sick" when they
deny it. Therefore, many patients after an episode of solitary confinement (or
forced drugging) will learn that the best way to avoid another one is to
acknowledge therapeutic benefit, even if this is not how they really feel.
When I was a patient, I remember thanking the staff for putting me into
solitary confinement, and stating that it helped me to regain control, being
[Vol. 15:597
Psychiatric Perspectives
The milieu of an institution's treatment program is often
considered an important aspect of the therapy.9 The preven-
tive detention basis for retention in the Washington statutel °°
is likely to influence the nature of the milieu in a counter-ther-
apeutic direction. Incapacitation is not consistent with thera-
peutic intent.1° ' Further, therapeutic milieus are vulnerable to
disruption by character-disordered individuals who are likely
to constitute the sexually violent predators. For these reasons,
expectations for meaningful progress in treatment under the
statute should be guarded. 10 2
D. Absence of Confidentiality
Confidentiality has traditionally been considered the sine
qua non of effective mental health treatment. 0 3  In many
cases, treatment cannot proceed without an assurance of confi-
dentiality, although a lack of assurance or a breach of confi-
dentiality may only interfere but not obviate effective
treatment. In recent years, increased societal demands for
information about a patient and his treatment have rendered
confidentiality in medicine, and to some degree, mental health
care, less controlling."°  Absolute confidentiality no longer
exits, if it ever did. Regrettably, confidentiality expectations of
patients exceed clinicians' actual behavior.105
Confidentiality in criminal settings or about criminal con-
quite conscious at the time that I was deliberately lying (and being quite
surprised that no one recognized it as such). I have heard innumerable
similar accounts from other patients and former patients. In fact, in the ex-
patients' movement, such tactics are known as "learning to play the game,"
and playing the game is widely recognized as the way to secure one's freedom.
Id. at 289.
99. David E. Raskin, Milieu Therapy Reexamined, 17 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY
695, 700 (1976).
100. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.060(1) (Supp. 1990-91) provides that "the person
shall be committed ... for control, care, and treatment until such time as . . . the
person is safe to be at large."
101. PSYCHOPATH LEGISLATION, supra note 3, at 925; Michael H. Sacks & William
T. Carpenter, The Pseudotherapeutic Community: An Examination of
Antitherapeutic Forces on Psychiatric Units, 25 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 315,
315 (1974).
102. Keith H. Johansen, The Impact of Patients with Chronic Character Pathology
on a Hospital Inpatient Unit, 34 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 842, 843 (1983).
103. Donald Schmid et al., Confidentiality in Psychiatry: A Study of the Patient's
View, 34 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 353, 353 (1983).
104. Mark Siegler, Confidentiality in Medicine-A Decrepit Concept, 307 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1518, 1518 (1982).
105. Barry D. Weiss, Confidentiality Expectations of Patients, Physicians, and
Medical Students, 247 JAMA 2695, 2695 (1982).
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duct has often been imperiled."° Therapists in community or
institutional programs, whether in forensic mental health or
corrections, are often pressured to share information about
their offender patients with others responsible for, or involved
in, release decisionmaking. Therapists nevertheless may
attempt to avoid or minimize doing so to protect their relation-
ship with the patient. This pressure not only presents ethical
dilemmas for the therapist,1 07 but more typically strains the
treatment relationship because, if the patient refuses to release
this information, he is viewed as uncooperative. Moreover, if
potentially favorable information is not shared, his release will
be less likely. In the absence of significant confidentiality in
the treatment of the sexually violent predator, offenders are
unlikely to ever disclose to their therapist the extent of past
sexual offending, given the stakes of indefinite detention under
the statute.10 Offenders have an obvious incentive to conceal
persistent sexually deviant fantasy and arousal during treat-
ment. Such a problem is not unique to treating sexually vio-
lent predators, but certainly appears likely to occur in a
106. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (finding duty
of psychotherapist to protect third party from a violent patient); Jorgensen v. State,
574 N.E.2d 915 (Ind. 1991) (finding no psychologist-patient privilege for homicide
information obtained from third party); In re Rules Adoption Regarding Inmate-
Therapist Confidentiality, 540 A.2d 212 (N.J. 1988) (challenging Department of
Corrections rules concerning the confidentiality of psychological services in prison);
People v. Doe, 570 N.E.2d 733 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (finding exception to the state's
confidentiality of mental health records and communications in the case of homicide);
In re Kevin F., 261 Cal. Rptr. 413 (Cal. App. 3d 1989) (holding that juvenile's
confession of arson during mandatory counseling with psychotherapist not privileged);
State v. Beatty, 770 S.W.2d 387 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that psychiatrist's
telephone call to crime reporting service to report his patient's crime did not violate
statutory physician-patient privilege); People v. Wharton, 280 Cal. Rptr. 631 (Cal. 1991)
(substance of therapist's warning to potential victim of patient fell within exception to
psychotherapist-patient statutory privilege), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 887 (1992); see also
Robert J. Kelly, Limited Confidentiality and the Pedophile, 38 Hosp. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 1046, 1047 (1987) (discussing tendency of some therapists to prematurely
break patient confidentiality in an effort to avoid legal liability under recent trends of
case law).
107. See infra notes 129-134, 143-161 and accompanying text.
108. Meg S. Kaplan et al., The Impact of Parolees'Perception of Confidentiality of
Their Self-Reported Sex Crimes, 3 ANNALS SEx RES. 293, 301-02 (1990) (finding that
parolees reported on average twenty-five times as many past child molestations to a
psychologist at an outpatient sex offender clinic as compared to incidents reported to a
parole officer; the parolees perceived "extensive" confidentiality during the
psychological interview and "limited" confidentiality during the interview with the
parole officer).
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treatment program for them under the statute. 10 9
E. Problems in Evaluating Treatment Progress
Under the statute, "[e]ach person committed under this
chapter shall have a current examination of his or her mental
condition made at least once every year.1 ' In addition to the
difficulties noted above in initially evaluating sex offenders for
purposes of adjudication as a sexually violent predator, there
are continuing obligations to evaluate the predators for evi-
dence of response to treatment. Such retention decisions pres-
ent additional difficulties.
Can treatment response be evaluated in custody? For
most offenders, the absence of available victims creates insur-
mountable problems in assessing treatment response."' These
problems were described by George Dix who observed the
release decisionmaking of hospital treatment teams for a sam-
ple of adjudicated sex psychopaths in California." 2  He
reported that staff appeared to rely on indirect rather than
direct evidence of treatment response in recommending
release." 3 Staff decisions to recommend release were influ-
enced by the following factors: the offender's acceptance of
guilt and personal responsibility for offending, the offender's
ability to manage stressful life events in an acceptable manner,
behavior during hospitalization, achievement of maximum ben-
efit from hospitalization, and change in community circum-
stances during hospitalization (e.g. absence of victims in a new
neighborhood)." 4
109. An exception occurs when the patient has an individual psychotherapist
without evaluative or administrative responsibility; see Blankstein, supra note 78:
We guarantee as much as possible the secrecy of individual psychotherapy.
The psychotherapist is not a member of the treatment team and has no part
in policy advices or planning of treatment. On the other hand, the
psychotherapist is well informed about the daily events and the conclusions of
treatment team meetings. We call his position "semi-integrated" and the
psychiatrist, who is a consultant to the treatment team, serves as an
intermediary between the psychotherapist and the treatment team.
Id. at 345.
110. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.070 (Supp. 1990-91).
111. This would be a lesser problem in the case of a homosexual rapist.
112. Dix, supra note 54, at 336.
113. Id. at 340.
114. Id. at 334-40. For sexual predators, a presumption of dangerousness continues
once the individual is in custody.
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F. Absence of Conditional or Gradual Release Programming
The statute fails to provide opportunities for the sexually
violent predator to make the transition between institutional-
ization and release to the community.11 5  Forensic and
nonforensic institutional mental health programs, as well as
many prison programs, commonly provide a continuum of care
that includes gradual release into the community.116 This pro-
cess is particularly important when an individual has been con-
fined to an institution for a period of years. While still
hospitalized, patients obtain privileges to leave the building,
hospital grounds, or hospital vicinity, for therapeutic purposes.
They may then be permitted to live in a supervised residential
setting for forensic or corrections patients. Followup treat-
ment in the community can be tightly linked to the institu-
tional programs. These provisions offer staff an opportunity to
evaluate the patient's functioning outside of the structured set-
ting, and guide the progress to eventual release. The absence of
statutory authority for coordinated services to allow gradual or
conditional release for sexually violent predators seriously
impairs the staff's ability to evaluate their progress and obtain
their release.
IV. ABUSES, COSTS, & RISKS
The Washington statute creates many opportunities for
misuse or abuse involving the mental health professions and
the clinicians involved in the implementation of its evaluation
and treatment components.'17 Some of these abuses will now
be considered.
115. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.09 (Supp. 1990-91).
116. See generally John Goldmeier et al., A Half-way House For Mentally Ill
Offenders, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 45 (1977); Ronald T. Greene, A Comprehensive
Mental Health Care System for Prison Inmates: Retrospective Look at New York's Ten
Year Experience, 11 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 381, 383 (1988); Stuart B. Silver &
Christine Tellefsen, Administrative Issues in the Follow-Up Treatment of Insanity
Acquittees, 18 J. MENTAL HEALTH ADMIN. 242, 242 (1991); Patricia A. Griffin et al.,
Designing Conditional Release Systems for Insanity Acquittees, 18 J. MENTAL HEALTH
ADMIN. 231, 231 (1991).
117. As previously noted, under the Washington law, mental health professionals
are involved in evaluating offenders for the presence of mental abnormalities,
personality disorders, and long-term likelihood of predatory sexual violence. The
mental health professional also may evaluate the safety of the person for release into
the community, as well as recommending treatment. See discussion supra Part II.
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A. Abuse of the Mental Health Professions and Professionals
Much has been written about the extent and significance
of medical and psychiatric authority in the United States.
Terms such as "medicalization" and "psychiatrization" convey
this notion.118 Psychiatric and psychology evaluations and tes-
timony are used in a wide array of criminal and civil litigation
to accomplish both treatment and nontreatment purposes. In
addition, society delegates authority to clinicians in innumera-
ble areas outside of litigation: employment screening," 9 work
disability, disability income, securing abortions or sterilization,
and attending school. 2 ° It is now well accepted that such
authority, independent of the service to the patient, serves a
social control function no less than that of policeman or judge.
Thomas Szasz described psychiatrists as "social tranquilizers"
who "attempt to harmonize, or tranquilize, interpersonal and
social discord.' 1 21 A commonly stated notion is that clinical
authority should be clearly limited in scope. 122 It is unclear to
what degree clinicians have sought such authority in contrast
to having it imposed upon them by society.
Clinicians are ambivalent about the social control function
assigned or offered to them by society. Many clinicians and
even some facilities do not, for example, work with involunta-
rily hospitalized patients even though every state permits civil
commitment of the mentally ill.123 Further, psychiatrists are
sometimes reluctant to pursue involuntary medication of
118. "Medicalization" and "psychiatrization" generally reflect the extent to which
nonmedical social or legal problems are redefined as medical problems with
corresponding medical solutions. See DOROTHY NELKIN & LAURENCE TANCREDI,
DANGEROUS DIAGNOSTICS: THE SOCIAL POWER OF BIOLOGICAL INFORMATION (1989).
119. Indeed, clinicians also retain authority to assess professionals practicing law
or medicine.
120. The medical excuse: "The idea that some mental states should be used as the
reason either to deprive people of some legal rights or to give them some extralegal
benefits goes back to the earliest records of our legal system." JONAS ROBITSCHER,
THE POWERS OF PSYCHIATRY 20 (1980). See generally Seymour L. Halleck,
Commentary, The Power of the Psychiatric Excuse, 53 MARQUETTE L. REV. 229 (1970).
121. THOMAS SzASz, LAW, LIBERTY & PSYCHIATRY 196 (1963).
122. "Psychiatrists should not have the authority of medicine in areas where their
expertise is not medical or even scientific: for example, claims that they can use
therapy to clear up problems of criminal deviancy should be exposed as overreaching."
Jonas Robitscher, The Limits of Psychiatric Authority, 1 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 183,
202 (1978).
123. See BRAKEL EL AL., supra note 58; Kenneth Tardiff, A Survey of Psychiatrists
in Boston and Their Work with Violent Patients, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1008, 1009
(1974) (stating that results of a survey revealed that fewer than half of Boston
psychiatrists evaluate or treat violent patients).
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civilly committed patients, even if this practice has been or
could be legally authorized. Though clinicians have acquiesced
to the imposition of a legal duty to protect third parties from
potentially violent patients, they are anxious and apprehensive
rather than enthusiastic about this responsibility. 124
Beyond clinicians' reluctance to exert social control func-
tions in civil treatment contexts, forensic mental health and
correctional settings have historically had difficulty attracting
well-trained, high quality, mental health specialists in suffi-
cient numbers.125 Few universities or medical schools have
academic affiliations with these programs, despite the growing
presence of post-graduate, sub-specialty fellowships in forensic
psychiatry and psychology. Few psychologists or psychiatrists
are trained in evaluating and treating sex offenders, and few
work in this area.
Several larger professional policy questions are created by
the Washington statute. Do organized psychiatry and psychol-
ogy need or want the social control responsibilities entailed in
the statute? Do clinicians want their social control authority
to be used to preventively and perhaps indefinitely detain sex
offenders in a largely custodial fashion? Further, do mental
health professionals have an obligation to work in such settings
or rather an obligation to refuse to work in such settings? The
committee of psychiatrists preparing the 1977 Group for the
Advancement of Psychiatry Report clearly opposed sexual psy-
chopath legislation 12 as did the Washington State Psychiatric
Association.127
The Washington statute and similar sexual psychopath
programs arguably constitute a misuse of the mental health
professions and the mental health professionals involved.
Using a pretext of offender treatability, with an offer of treat-
ment, to conceal the underlying agenda of indefinite, preven-
tive detention constitutes an abuse; it allows clinicians to
collude with a nonclinical social agenda, with substantial likely
harm to the offender through excessive false positive predic-
tions of sexual violence. 2
124. Gregory B. Leong, The Expansion of Psychiatric Participation in Social
Control, 40 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 240 (1989).
125. ROBITSCHER, supra note 120, at 44, 50.
126. PSYCHOPATH LEGISLATION, supra note 3, at 843.
127. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Washington State Psychiatric Ass'n, In re Young
(Wash. filed Sept. 20, 1991) (No. 57837-1).
128. Compare Anthony D. Oliver, The Sex Offender: Lessons from the California
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B. Abuse by Mental Health Professionals
The professional and popular literature contains an abun-
dant critique of the roles and practice of mental health profes-
sionals in the courts."2 Clinicians have several opportunities
to misuse their roles and responsibilities under the statute.
Clinicians may misread the scientific literature, or overesti-
mate their clinical expertise, and conclude that their ability to
assess and predict long-term sexually violent behavior is suffi-
ciently sound so as to justify indefinite incarceration. Risk
assessments are notoriously judgment-oriented and subjective,
given the absence of actuarial data and formal decisionmaking
rules. 3 °
A clinician who has a concealed social control or emotional
agenda (countertransference hostility to sex offenders and
criminals 3 ) has ample opportunity to conduct biased risk
assessments and testify accordingly. 32  Such misuse is more
Experience, 5 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 403, 407 (1982); with the American Medical
Association's prohibition of participation in capital punishment under its Principles of
Medical Ethics, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, OPINIONS OF THE ETHICS COMMITTEE ON
THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS WITH ANNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO
PSYCHIATRY § 1, n.4 (1989) [hereinafter MEDICAL ETHICS].
129. David Faust & Jay Ziskin, The Expert Witness in Psychology and Psychiatry,
241 SCIENCE 31, 32 (1988); see also SzAsz, supra note 121, at 69-70; SEYMOUR L.
HALLECK, THE MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDER 137-39 (1986); see generally Alan A.
Stone, The Ethical Boundaries of Forensic Psychiatry: A View from the Ivory Tower,
12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 209 (1984).
130. Faust & Ziskin, supra note 129, at 33 (discussing factors limiting clinical
judgment including limits in scientific knowledge, limits in clinical judgment,
overconfidence, and an expert's claim that limitations in scientific evidence do not
apply to him).
131. See generally John R. Lion & Stephan A. Pasternak, Cauntertransference
Reactions to Violent Patients, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 207 (1973); Friedemann Pfiifflin,
The Contempt of Psychiatric Experts for Sexual Convicts: Evaluation of 936 Files from
Sexual Offense Cases at Courts in the State of Hamburg, Germany, 2 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 485 (1979).
132. "Professionals who testify as experts are always defenders of their opinions.
It is not at all unusual, however, for an expert witness to go further and become an
advocate for a party, or political or social point of view. Indeed, attorneys commonly
endeavor to have an expert witness become an advocate for one 'side' of the case."
Steven R. Smith, Mental Health Expert Witnesses: Of Science and Crystal Balls, 7
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 145, 154 (1989). See also ROBITSCHER, supra note 120, at 24: "Many
testifying psychiatrists are prosecution-minded. . . . [Plsychiatrists are not always
merciful with the feeling that everyone should be treated and no one should be
punished. There are hanging judges, and there are hanging psychiatrists."
Psychiatrist James Grigson, M.D., has been dubbed "Dr. Death" for his repeated
testimony in Texas capital murder cases claiming "100 percent certainty" that the
defendant is a sociopath and will again be violent in the future, without having
personally examined the defendant. As of February 1992, Dr. Grigson had testified in
144 death penalty cases; of these cases, 139 were for the prosecution. In 131 of the 139
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likely to occur because sex offenders typically provoke strong
countertransference feelings or primitive emotional feelings
such as rage and vengeance in evaluators and therapists, as
well as the public. Michael Saks has referred to those experts
as "imperial" when they "display a willingness, first, to disre-
gard what knowledge has been developed by the field from
which they claim to derive their expertise and to substitute for
that their own guesses."' 33 It is difficult to decide how to man-
age and regulate these abuses."M
C. Abuse of Other Prison Inmates
Implementation of the statute is likely to adversely affect
sex offenders in prison who have not yet been adjudicated sex-
ually violent predators. Conceivably, the statute will under-
mine the voluntary prison treatment of sex offenders should
offenders come to realize that it is disadvantageous to reveal
the extent of their past sexual offending. One need not be
paranoid to believe that such information would later find its
way to those interested in indefinitely detaining the offender
as a predator. A pervasive lack of confidentiality, with the pos-
sibility of indefinite detention as a predator, would likely dele-
teriously affect all assessment or treatment programs for sex
offenders, whether in the community, or in institutional set-
tings.'35 Alternatively, the creation of the predator treatment
cases, the defendant was sentenced to death. On one occasion, he was reprimanded for
an ethics violation for this testimony by the American Psychiatric Association. THE
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, February 16, 1992, at E1-2. See also Mary Ann Deitchman et
al., Self-Selection Factors in the Participation of Mental Health Professionals in
Competency for Execution Evaluations, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 287 (1991) (finding
that clinicians' decisions to participate in competency for execution evaluations were
partially a function of attitudes toward capital punishment).
133. Michael J. Saks, Expert Witnesses, Nonexpert Witnesses, and Nonwitness
Experts, 14 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 291, 294 (1990).
134. Teaching legal psychiatry has taught me that most psychiatrists are
almost totally uninterested in questioning the legitimacy of their psychiatric
power . . . Neither psychiatrist nor lawyer has carefully addressed the
problem of the proper limits of psychiatric authority. Yet I am convinced that
psychiatric decision making has become so threatening, so invasive, that it
deserves serious attention now.
ROBITSCHER, supra note 120, at xvi-xvii.
135. Information obtained in previous psychiatric evaluations conducted for
sentencing purposes becomes part of the offender's corrections records. This
information could later be used to adjudicate him as a sexual predator, even if the
evaluating psychiatrist had warned the evaluee of its nonconfidentiality at the time. It
is doubtful, however, that such a waiver of confidentiality would be adequate because
the offender would not have been aware of its potential use under the statute years
later.
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program may motivate prisoners to seek treatment on a volun-
tary basis to ensure that they will not later be indefinitely
detained as a predator.
As already noted above, the predator program could com-
pete for funding with sex offender treatment in corrections. It
could divert resources from voluntary treatment programs that
might be more successful on an individual or societal basis
given the larger numbers of that group and the earlier oppor-
tunities for intervention.
D. Abuse of the Patients
Conceivably, an indefinitely detained offender under the
statute might elect surgical castration (orchiectomy) as a
means to ensure his release to the community as safe. A court
or jury might be persuaded that, although there are no guaran-
tees that a castrated male could not sexually reoffend,'3 8 cas-
tration could provide adequate assurance of safety to
accomplish release from incarceration. Assuming that the nec-
essary personnel and resources were available to the offender,
would such a result be socially or ethically desirable? Would
such consent be considered unduly coerced or involuntary
given his indefinite incarceration? 3 7 Would the presence of
the statute, by inculcating an offender's fear of indefinite
detention, indirectly promote an excessive, punitive response
(i.e., unnecessary castrations)? On the other hand, would the
unavailability of chemical (medroxyprogesterone acetate) or
surgical castration in the treatment program improperly deny
a legally competent individual the opportunity to procure his
release when no alternative is available? Similar concerns
have been raised with the issue of behavior control or modifi-
cation techniques for those involuntarily detained.'3 8
136. Nicholas Heim & Carolyn J. Hursch, Castration for Sex Offenders:
Treatment or Punishment? A Review and Critique of Recent European Literature, 8
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 281, 298 (1979) (discussing the percentage of castrated males
whose sex drive was unaffected).
137. See generally Jim Rees, Voluntary Castration of Mentally Disordered Sex
Offenders, 13 CRiM. L. BULL. 30 (1977); Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health
No. 73-19434-AW (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne County, July 10, 1973) reported in 1 MENTAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 147 (1976); Dennis H. Rainier, Comment, The Use of Depo-Provera
for Treating Male Sex Offenders: A Review of the Constitutional and Medical Issues,
16 U. TOL. L. REV. 181 (1984).
138. See generally Richard Singer, Consent of the Unfree (Parts 1 & 2), 1 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 1, 101 (1977); Michael H. Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior
Control: Autonomy and the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 237
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Creation of a special class of sex offenders provides oppor-
tunities for stigmatization and scapegoating by society, enraged
by the well-publicized failures of the criminal justice system to
prevent or control crime. A false sense of physical and psycho-
logical comfort is offered when we judge others to be different
from the rest of us and to then isolate and send them away. It
is unlikely that the program will appreciably reduce the inci-
dence of sexual offending in the community, unless unusually
large numbers of offenders are indeterminately detained.
V. ETHICAL ISSUES
The sexually violent predator statute presents many
potential ethical problems to the clinicians involved in the
evaluation, treatment, and release of the offenders. I will
attempt to address only one of these ethical dilemmas, that
relating to mental health expertise and testimony. 3 9
It should initially be noted that the ethics of the forensic
(i.e., testifying evaluator) clinician are not so clearly, if at all,
predicated upon the well-recognized principles of medical eth-
ics.4 ° that apply in the ordinary clinical or treatment setting.14'
The principles of beneficence (seeking to do good) and
nonmaleficence ("do no harm"), that are applicable to an iden-
tifable physician-patient relationship, seem incongruous in the
context of an evaluation of criminal responsibility, or of future
sexual violence, where the client is a litigant or the adversary
system itself. As indicated below, forensic evaluators have
responsibilities to avoid harming the evaluee (e.g., truth-tell-
(1974); R. SCHWITZGEBEL, DEVELOPMENT AND LEGAL REGULATION OF COERCIVE
BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES WITH OFFENDERS (1971).
139. Other ethical issues presented by the statute, though not necessarily unique
to it, include involuntary treatment, the competency of sexually violent predators to
consent or refuse treatment, and confidentiality. The issue of confidentiality assumes
such importance because expert testimony is the "ticket" through which an individual
is adjudicated a sexually violent predator and involuntarily detained, potentially for a
lifetime. Dix reported that "[tihe California program and virtually all other existing
programs for special processing of abnormal [sex] offenders rely heavily upon
recommendations for clinicians such as examining physicians or psychiatrists." George
E. Dix, Differential Processing of Abnormal Sex Offenders: Utilization of California's
Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Program, 67 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 233, 236
(1976).
140. See generally TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (3d ed. 1989) (discussing the ethical principles of the medical
profession).
141. See Paul J. Appelbaum, The Parable of the Forensic Psychiatrist: Ethics and
the Problem of Doing Harm, 13 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 249, 251 (1990).
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ing). However, forensic evaluators serve the ends of promoting
justice and protecting society, quite clearly apart from the indi-
viduals whom they evaluate.'42 Thus, the harm that derives
from their expert testimony (i.e., indefinite commitment as a
sexual predator, capital punishment, loss of child custody) can-
not be equated with the harms that occur due to negligence in
patient care.
Expert testimony by mental health professionals is
legally 43 and ethically acceptable only when predicated upon
legitimate expertise.'" Such testimony must also be honest
and objective. Though expert testimony regarding the predic-
tion of long-term violence has met constitutional standards at
least in the context of capital punishment,'45 such testimony
does not necessarily meet ethical standards, either in general
or in a given case. Given the uncertain empirical support of
clinicians' abilities to predict future violence whether sexual or
not, it is reasonable to question the ethics of clinical predic-
tions of sexual violence by which an offender is initially adjudi-
cated a sexual predator, and then is retained within the
program as unsafe for release. The codes of ethics governing
general and forensic psychiatry as well as general and forensic
psychology address some of these issues, which will now be
considered.
Clinicians have a general ethical obligation to maintain the
highest standard of professional competence, as well as recog-
nize their professional limitations.' 46  Further, in the evalua-
142. PSYCHIATRY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 63, at 7.
143. FED. R. EVID. 702.
144. "Forensic psychologists have an obligation to present to the court ... the
factual bases (knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education) for their
qualification as an expert, and the relevance of those factual bases to their
qualification as an expert on the specific matters at issue." Committee on Ethical
Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists, Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists,
15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 655, 658 & § IIIB (1991) [hereinafter Forensic Psychologist
Guidelines].
145. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (upholding use of psychiatric
testimony based upon hypothetical questions about a defendant who had never been
examined).
146. "Psychologists recognize the boundaries of their competence and the
limitations of their techniques. They only provide services and only use techniques for
which they are qualified by training and experience . . . Psychologists accurately
represent their competence, education, training, and experience." American
Psychological Association, Ethical Principles of Psychologists (amended June 2, 1989),
45 AM. PSYCHOL. 390, Principle 2, 391-92 (1990). "A psychiatrist who regularly
practices outside his/her area of professional competence should be considered
unethical." MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 128, § 2, n.3.
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tive or forensic context, the forensic clinician can only claim
expertise when deserved, and must present his qualifications
accurately.147 Thus, the ethical clinician may not undeservedly
claim expertise with a particular clinical population (e.g.,
mental retardation, organic mental disorders, schizophrenia,
pedophilia), particularly in court testimony. Forensic clinicians
must present their findings and opinions in a fair and objective
manner 148 and must guard against the possible misrepresenta-
tion of their work. 49 They must resist the potential for abuse
resulting from personal issues'50 or from having been retained
by one party to the litigation.' 5 '
Whether a clinician may ethically testify about another
person's psychiatric diagnosis, mental capacities, or future
behavior without a personal examination is also relevant to the
administration of the statute. What limitations does an
inmate's refusal to submit to an examination pursuant to the
statute impose on the clinician's findings and conclusions?
This, too, has been addressed in several ethical codes. The
American Psychiatric Association has expressed the view that
it is unethical to offer a professional opinion "about an individ-
ual who is in the light of public attention, or who has disclosed
147. "Expertise in the practice of forensic psychiatry is claimed only in areas of
actual knowledge and skills, training, and experience." AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw, ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE PRACTICE OF FORENSIC
PSYCHIATRY § V (rev. 1989) [hereinafter FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY GUIDELINES].
148. "When testifying, forensic psychologists have an obligation to all parties to a
legal proceeding to present their findings, conclusion, evidence, or other professional
products in a fair manner ... Forensic psychologists do not, by either commission or
omission, participate, in a misrepresentation of their evidence, nor do they participate
in partisan attempts to avoid, deny, or subvert the presentation of evidence contrary to
their own opinion." Forensic Psychologist Guidelines, supra note 144, § VIII(D), at
664.
149. "Forensic psychologists take reasonable steps to correct misuse or
misrepresentation of their professional products, evidence, and testimony." Id.
§ VII(A)1, at 663.
150. Forensic psychologists recognize that their own personal values, moral
beliefs, or personal and professional relationships with parties to a legal
proceeding may interfere with their ability to practice competently. Under
such circumstances, forensic psychologists are obligated to decline
participation or to limit their assistance in a manner consistent with
professional obligations.
Id. § III(E), at 658.
151. Being retained by one side in a civil or criminal matter exposes the
forensic psychiatrist to the potential for unintended bias and the danger of
distortion of his opinion. It is the responsibility of the forensic psychiatrist to
minimize such hazards by carrying out his responsibilities in an honest matter
striving to reach an objective opinion.
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY GUIDELINES, supra note 147, § IV cmt.
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information about himself/herself through public media" '52
without having conducted an examination. This "Goldwater
Rule" was developed to apply to public political figures rather
than criminal defendants and would not bar testimony without
an examination in the latter case.15 3 The American Academy
of Psychiatry and the Law also permits such testimony as a
last resort, and only if the expert acknowledges the limitations
of such testimony l 4 Forensic psychologists are similarly cau-
tioned about testifying without conducting an examination, but
are not forbidden from doing so.15 5
Thomas Grisso and Paul Appelbaum reject the argument
that it is unethical per se (i.e., in theory, in all cases) to offer
predictions of future violence in expert testimony because of
the lack of scientific data.'56 Their contention is based in part
upon the ubiquity of such predictions in many forensic mental
health contexts including civil commitment where general data
supports such risk assessments or predictions for persons or
diagnostic groups similar to the particular patient at issue.5 7
152. MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 128, § 7, n.3.
153. Id. § 7-A, at 37-38.
154. Honesty, objectivity and the adequacy of the clinical evaluation may be
called into question when an expert opinion is offered without a personal
examination. While there are authorities who would bar an expert opinion in
regard to an individual who has not been personally examined, it is the
position of the Academy that if, after earnest effort, it is not possible to
conduct a personal examination, an opinion may be rendered on the basis of
other information. However, under such circumstances, it is the responsibility
of the forensic psychiatrist to assure that the statement of his opinion and any
reports or testimony based on this opinion clearly indicate that there was no
personal examination and that the opinion expressed is thereby limited.
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY GUIDELINES, supra note 147, § IV cmt.
155. Forensic psychologists avoid giving written or oral evidence about the
psychological characteristics of particular individuals when they have not had
an opportunity to conduct an examination of the individual adequate to the
scope of the statements, opinions, or conclusions to be issued. Forensic
psychologists make every reasonable effort to conduct such examinations.
When it is not possible or feasible to do so, they make clear the impact of such
limitations on the reliability and validity of their professional products,
evidence, or testimony.
Forensic Psychologist Guidelines, supra note 144, § VI(H), at 663.
156. Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, Working Paper Series 2: Is It
Unethical to Offer Predictions of Future Violence? (1991), L. & HUM. BEHAV.
(publication forthcoming).
157. In summary, not all predictive statements about future violence are
unethical due to lack of scientific support, because predictive testimony stated
as a risk estimate sometimes is scientifically supported. Moreover, the fact
that the scientific evidence manifests significant false-positive rates does not
detract from the potential value of risk estimates for courts' legal decisions
about restrictions of liberty.
632 University of Puget Sound Law Review
Even if one were to accept their view, however, expert testi-
mony regarding the prediction of sexual violence under the
statute might be considered unethical in some cases, especially
because the consequences of such testimony are substantial.
Such clear cases would include the "expert" without true
expertise (i.e., no clinical training, knowledge, or experience
with a specific population such as mentally retarded sex
offenders or a particular paraphilia),'15 where the data base
(i.e., base rates of sexual offending) for a particular population
is inadequate to offer risk assessments about the individual in
question, or testimony beyond one's expertise (e.g., assertions
of infallibility or omniscience, misreading scientific data, equa-
tion of short-term and long-term predictions). Having failed to
conduct an examination of the alleged sexual predator, while
still testifying that he is "likely to engage in predatory acts of
sexual violence,"' 9 cannot by itself seemingly constitute
unethical conduct, but this factor can be used in conjunction
with other elements to decide whether an expert's conduct and
testimony in a given case was ethical.
While it may not be possible at present to condemn as
unethical every long-term prediction of sexual violence offered
in a Washington court,160 even those made without a personal
examination or contemporaneous testing, we should be ethi-
cally wary of expert testimony that pretends to great validity
about the long-term predictions of sexual violence. Such testi-
mony should be rigorously scrutinized.' 6 ' Caution is especially
important given the stakes of indefinite confinement as a sex-
ual predator.
VI. CONCLUSION
I have attempted to argue that Washington's Sexually Vio-
lent Predator Act, part of the larger Community Protection
Id. at 12.
158. See, e.g., Skaggs v. Commonwealth, 803 S.W.2d 573 (Ky. 1990) (finding that
forensic psychologist testifying at trial for a criminal defendant was a fraud), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 140 (1991); Joseph v. Board of Med., 587 A.2d 1085 (D.C. 1991)
(finding that physician testifying as expert in medical malpractice case misrepresented
his credentials and was reprimanded by State Board of Med.).
159. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(1) (Supp. 1990-91).
160. Paradoxically, ethically prohibiting long-term predictions of sexual violence
could bar long-term predictions of sexual nonviolence.
161. I am not here concerned with legal procedures such as cross-examination that
are often not adequate to impeach the purportedly unethical testimony; see Smith,
supra note 132, at 164-65.
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Act, establishes a mechanism of indeterminate preventive
detention rather than a treatment program under the parens
patriae authority of the state. Purporting to offer treatment to
a group of sex offenders in this context is a facade for the
underlying social control that is established.
The statute's conceptualization and designation of a special
category of sex offender as a sexual predator largely fails to
coincide with clinical or empirical knowledge regarding sex
offenders. The vagueness of the definition of a sexual predator
permits widely discrepant and subjective inclusion criteria.
The statute creates insurmountable problems for clinicians in
the prediction of sexual violence, especially over the long term.
It is uncertain, perhaps unlikely, whether the program
will receive treatable sexual predators or be able to provide
meaningful treatment to them. Of great import for the mental
health professionals and professions involved, there are poten-
tial abuses by or of the participants in the process (society,
evaluators, therapists, inmates, sexual predators). The statute
will again raise questions about the role and responsibilities of
clinicians when they work in criminal settings.
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